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FREE SPEECH AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRANSFORMATION 
Daniel Hildebrand* 
"[This case] raises questions of grave importance transcending 
the local interests involved in the particular action." So wrote Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes in Near v. Minnesota,1 the second 
Supreme Court case to protect free speech under a conscious and 
articulated theory of the First Amendment. In an extraordinary 
series of opinions throughout the 1930s, Hughes and Justice Owen 
Roberts went on to author a First Amendment jurisprudence based 
upon the centrality of free speech in a democratic government. Per-
haps because the Warren Court offered such admirable support for 
free speech during the civil rights era, perhaps because Hughes and 
Roberts never matched the grand rhetoric of Brandeis in Whitney v. 
California2 or Brennan in New York Times v. Sul/ivan,3 or perhaps 
because FOR's court-packing plan gave a special historical promi-
nence to the 1930s commerce clause cases, the First Amendment 
decisions of the Hughes Court receive scant attention in modem 
scholarship. Two central lessons are obscured by this neglect: first, 
that a coherent First Amendment tradition honoring the centrality 
of rich public debate begins as early as the 1930s, and second, that 
the main constitutional achievements of the 1930s Court-newly le-
gitimate national economic regulation and incipient protection of 
minorities under the Fourteenth Amendment-are Siamese twins, 
born of the First Amendment cases and linked by the triumph of 
national interests over "local interests" like those alluded to in 
Near. 
The first lesson of the Hughes Court First Amendment cases 
concerns the popular sense of how long courts have understood and 
protected free speech. If there is a popular vision of the Court's free 
speech tradition, it runs something as follows: free speech issues 
• Law Clerk, 1992-93, to the Honorable Walter J. Cummings, Circuit Judge, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. I wish to thank Owen Fiss and Akhil Amar 
of the Yale Law School, Richard Friedman of the University of Michigan Law School, my 
co-clerk Matthew J. Jacobs and Heidi Steele of McDermott, Will & Emery. 
I. 283 u.s. 697, 707 (1931). 
2. 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
3. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
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were either non-existent or ignored by the Court from the Bill of 
Rights until the 1920s. Then, the Court got off to a bad start in the 
Red Scare cases, upholding shockingly repressive state and federal 
statutes with little or no First Amendment review, while Holmes 
and Brandeis registered ringing dissents. The wisdom of these dis-
sents gradually became law, but under the grip of the early "clear 
and present danger test," the Court was slow to articulate a sophis-
ticated First Amendment jurisprudence with consistent results in 
hard cases. Not until the 1960s did the free speech of minorities 
and other unpopular groups enjoy full protection; not until New 
York Times did the Court express "a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open. "4 Offered most prominently by 
Harry Kalven's scholarship, this view of First Amendment juris-
prudence deserves revision. 
Focusing on the First Amendment decisions of the Hughes 
Court allows those who champion free speech to draw on a judicial 
tradition thirty years older than the 1960s, one less vulnerable to 
rhetoric that attacks the liberalism of the Warren Court as depen-
dent on an activist, overreaching federal judiciary. If Hughes Court 
decisions reveal the same theoretical framework and the same basic 
values as Warren Court decisions, then scholars or critics can speak 
more forcefully of a consistent, core free speech tradition that rec-
ognizes and affirms the central importance of rich public debate to 
American democracy. The language and logic of the Hughes Court 
First Amendment decisions reveal that they establish virtually all 
the theories and protections of New York Times and the "modern" 
1960s cases, while avoiding the complex, often sterile formalism of 
more recent decisions. 
The second lesson of the Hughes Court First Amendment 
cases probes a different professional narrative, the one which ac-
counts for the changes the 1930s wrought in constitutional jurispru-
dence. The standard view of this period, as offered in first semester 
constitutional law courses, runs as follows: The Lochner era Court 
read the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to pro-
tect liberty of contract and invalidated many congressional efforts 
to regulate the national economy. Pressured by the "court pack-
ing" plan of the popular Roosevelt administration, the Court finally 
backed down in the steel strike case.s In famous footnote four of 
United States v. Caro/ene Products,6 a subsequent case upholding 
4. ld. at 270. 
5. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937). 
6. 304 u.s. 144, 152 (1938). 
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Congress's authority to regulate the milk industry, the Court sug-
gested that it would still apply heightened scrutiny to laws that 
were insulated from legislative review, or laws that affected minori-
ties who might be less protected by the political process. The tradi-
tional view of this famous shift in commerce clause jurisprudence 
juxtaposes judicial deference and judicial scrutiny. It focuses on is-
sues of constitutional interpretation, as though the Court after 
Carolene Products redirected all its substantive due process energy 
to a more appropriate arena, and learned an important separation-
of-powers lesson in judicial legitimacy. 
The cases cited in Carolene Products's footnote four, however, 
sketch a more complicated picture, revealing that the Court's shift 
in the 1937 commerce clause cases borrowed from a vision of na-
tionalism first expressed in First Amendment cases like Near. In 
both the later commerce clause cases and the free speech cases, the 
Court was willing to recognize that local actions (economic or polit-
ical) had profound national ramifications, and hence were subject to 
review and correction by the national government. The differing 
institutional settings can easily obscure this basic similarity-it is 
not obvious that Supreme Court protection of local fringe groups 
from municipal or state suppression raises the same issues as na-
tional regulation of Schechter's local poultry business. Recall that 
the Four Horsemen typically supported the local oppressor of the 
Jehovah's Witness or the Communist as well as the local business 
chafing under congressional regulation, however, and one's focus 
sharpens: the critical issue becomes the conflict of local and na-
tional imperatives, not the degree or sphere of judicial scrutiny. 
The first great achievement of the Hughes Court lay in asserting 
that local suppression of speech could corrupt the national demo-
cratic process. Six years later the Court applied essentially the same 
nationalist logic to uphold new regulation of local economic activity 
under the commerce clause. 
The parallels between the Hughes Court's First Amendment 
cases and its later commerce clause cases are startling when viewed 
in this light. Like the post-1936 commerce clause opinions, the 
early First Amendment opinions flew in the face of recent and di-
rectly contrary precedents. They took power away from local poli-
ties-power to regulate speech in the general welfare-and 
transferred control and review of free speech to the Supreme Court, 
an arm of the national government. The First Amendment opin-
ions, followed by the commerce clause cases, championed a new 
faith in the ability of the national government to monitor the demo-
cratic process and the economy in service of greater freedom and 
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prosperity for the entire country. In method, inspiration and result, 
then, the free speech cases prefigured the "switch-in-time" of the 
more famous commerce clause cases. Against the common picture 
of a decisive shift in constitutional jurisprudence around the events 
of 1936, the First Amendment decisions work their subtle revolu-
tion in 1931-before Roosevelt was twice elected, before he resorted 
to threats of court packing. 
These nationalist free speech cases were paralleled by the 
Hughes Court's articulation of a national commitment to minimum 
requirements of due process in criminal proceedings. Synthesizing 
these developments, the Court in Palko v. Connecticut held that 
states would be bound to respect elements in the Bill of Rights that 
were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."1 Palko was one of 
the first decisions to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states. 
Comparison of the cases cited in Palko and Caro/ene Products 
reveals that both relied on free speech cases such as Stromberg v. 
Californias and DeJonge v. Oregon.9 By reflecting more deeply on 
the notion of a national commitment to civil rights, the free speech 
cases also helped inspire the incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
against the states. 
The free speech theory of the 1930s cases directly relates to 
their role as a harbinger of constitutional change. If one underplays 
the coherence of the Hughes Court's free speech theory, one misses 
the recurrent emphasis that speech must be protected as central to 
peaceable, orderly change in the government. This emphasis in 
tum makes local suppression of speech an assault on the vitality of 
the national democratic process. Understanding the nationalism of 
the free speech cases thus renders famous footnote four of Caro/ene 
Products less dramatic. The footnote is best read as a belated ac-
knowledgement of continuity between the recent commerce clause 
cases, the First Amendment decisions and the protection of funda-
mental liberties promised by Palko. Emphasis on the democratic 
political process permeates the text of the entire footnote; it melds 
perfectly with the case's support for national economic regulation 
by Congress. Localism is out, national democracy is in. 
In sum, then, the free speech cases of the 1930s teach two ex-
citing lessons. First, they establish the democratic importance of 
rich public debate while elaborating most essential modem free 
speech doctrines by 1940. Second, they foreshadow the great shifts 
in commerce clause and due process jurisprudence and identify 
7. 302 u.s. 319, 325 (1937). 
8. 283 u.s. 359 (1931). 
9. 299 u.s. 353 (1937). 
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1931 as a critical watershed in the major constitutional changes of 
the 1930s. Part I of this paper offers a brief introduction to the free 
speech tradition before 1930. Part II shows that Near and 
Stromberg prove both the lessons outlined above: they offer a free 
speech theory that identifies democratic debate as the core of the 
First Amendment and they break radically from earlier cases that 
subordinated free speech to principles of federalism. Part III ex-
plores how the cases that followed Near developed most of the doc-
trines used in modern First Amendment analysis. Part IV examines 
the parallels between the free speech cases of 1931 and later devel-
opments in commerce clause, due process and Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence and proposes that the free speech cases helped 
initiate the great constitutional changes of the 1930s. 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT BEFORE THE 
HUGHES COURT 
Between the Alien and Sedition Acts and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, courts had little occasion to review the meaning of the 
First Amendment. Under Barron v. Baltimore,w the First Amend-
ment did not apply to the states, so various state efforts to restrict 
speech were not reviewable in the federal courts. Most notable state 
suppressions of First Amendment rights occurred in the South be-
tween the 1830s and the 1860s: Southern states placed severe re-
strictions on distribution of abolitionist literature, forbade Blacks 
from assembling for religious or other purposes and even criminal-
ized teaching Blacks to read the Bible. II Before the civil war, basic 
state law on free speech remained similar to that found in the Eng-
lish common law and Blackstone: prior restraints were forbidden, 
but punishment of speech was permissible and truth was not a de-
fense to charges of seditious libel absent good motives.12 Aside 
from abuses related to support for slavery, however, few prosecu-
tions for what today would be considered First Amendment activity 
occurred. 
After the Civil War, the Slaughter-House Cases read only nar-
row rights such as habeas corpus and petition or assembly to bind 
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 so the First Amend-
ment still did not check state suppression of speech. Between the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Red Scare cases of 
10. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
II. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale 
L.J. 1193, 1215-17 (1992). 
12. See Leonard W. Levy, The Emergence of a Free Press (Oxford U. Press, 1985). 
13. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872). 
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the 1920s, courts were very hostile to free speech, regularly support-
ing state and local actions that would now be considered egregious 
breaches of the First Amendment.I4 A few cases serve to illustrate 
the flavor of First Amendment jurisprudence in this era. Reveal-
ingly, two were by Justice Holmes, belated author of pro-free 
speech dissents in the 1920s. 
Davis v. Massachusetts 1s reviewed an ordinance that forbade 
speaking on the commons and public garden without a permit from 
the mayor, who routinely granted permits to political speakers. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the ordinance was prop-
erly used to bar the speeches of a local religious critic of the mayor. 
Patterson v. Colorado 16 upheld the contempt conviction of a U.S. 
Senator who criticized a local court proceeding in the Colorado pa-
pers. At the time his editorials were published, the Colorado case 
was concluded save for motions for rehearing and publishing of the 
decision; there were no jury bias issues to favor punishing the edito-
rials. Finally, Fox v. Washington 11 upheld the conviction of a local 
nudist who criticized state indecency laws. The nudist had pub-
lished a diatribe in a local paper, criticizing the puritanism of those 
who sought to have the indecency laws enforced against a local nu-
dist colony. A Washington state court found that his article was an 
incitement to violate the state indecency laws, and convicted the 
writer under a statute banning advocacy to break the law. In all 
three cases, the Supreme Court found that the convictions raised no 
First Amendment issues. 
Fox and Patterson contained a hopeful note that was to prove 
fruitful in the future: both declined to decide whether free speech 
was protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, finding the question unnecessary to resolve the case. If a 
question remains open without being decided long enough, it be-
comes a small matter for the Court to decide the question either 
way-and in Gitlow v. New York,1s the Court in an opinion by Jus-
tice Sanford assumed in passing that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
due process clause barred states from restricting free speech rights. 
Sanford cited Fox, Patterson and Robertson v. Baldwin.I9 The role of 
the First Amendment in fostering incorporation will be taken up in 
14. See David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 Yale L.J. 
514 (1981). 
15. 167 u.s. 43 (1897). 
16. 205 u.s. 454 (1907). 
17. 236 u.s. 273 (1915). 
18. 268 u.s. 652, 666 (1925). 
19. 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (reviewing limits on fundamental freedoms in the Bill of 
Rights, including limits on free speech). 
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greater detail later, but this review provides a brief backdrop to the 
Hughes and Roberts decisions of the 1930s. 
In 1919, the Supreme Court finally began to address the sub-
stantive meaning of the First Amendment. Opinions between 1919 
and 1931 debated the "clear and present danger" test, with results 
consistently adverse to the speaker who criticized the government. 
The majority opinions held that legislatures (state or federal) had a 
right to punish speech that could lead to bad acts. All that was 
necessary, in essence, was a legislative finding that certain speech 
had a "dangerous tendency" to incite lawless action. Holmes and 
Brandeis argued in frequent dissent that only speech which incited 
imminent, serious lawless action could be banned by the govern-
ment. Holmes and Brandeis developed their clear and present dan-
ger theory slowly, over the course of several decisions.2o The 
Brandeis concurrence in Whitney v. California is probably the most 
eloquent judicial defense of free speech ever delivered;2I it is also the 
most developed theoretical synthesis of First Amendment principles 
in any 1920s decision. 
Dissents do not make a working jurisprudence, however. 
While Brandeis (with prompting and support from Holmes, Chaffee 
and others) expressed most of the enduring ideals that have 
animated First Amendment law to the present day, he did not have 
the opportunity to apply these ideals to diverse factual problems in 
majority opinions. That task fell to Hughes and Roberts, who 
adapted Brandeis's opinions, moved beyond the clear and present 
danger test, and founded a mature First Amendment jurisprudence 
based on a nuanced respect for the centrality of dissent and debate 
to American democracy. 
II. STROMBERG AND NEAR 
On February 24, 1930, Charles Evans Hughes was sworn in as 
chief justice of the United States Supreme Court. This event came 
late in a career of distinguished public service; Hughes had been 
governor of New York, the republican candidate for president in 
1916 (he nearly defeated incumbent Wilson), secretary of state, a 
judge on the World Court, and even (1910-1916) an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court. 22 In the words of Paul Freund, clerk for 
20. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1205 (1983); Harry Kalven, Jr., A Wonhy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in 
America 130-166 (Harper & Row, 1988) ("A Wonhy Tradition"). Both offer excellent treat-
ment of the 1920s cases. 
21. 274 U.S. at 375-76. 
22. Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appointments to 
the Supreme Coun 168-71, 201-34 (Oxford U. Press, 3d ed. 1992). 
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Brandeis in 1932 and distinguished law professor at Harvard, 
Hughes was to become a Chief Justice of "Marshallian" stature.2J 
The first two First Amendment cases to come before his court cor-
roborate Freund's judgment, for Hughes's majority opinions estab-
lished a sophisticated groundwork, self-consciously practical as well 
as theoretical, for future cases that could and did come before the 
Court. They also wrought a decisive shift in principles of federal-
ism that heralded the Court's later commerce clause and due pro-
cess cases. 
Stromberg v. California,24 decided a month before Near v. Min-
nesota25 in May of 1931, was the more cautious of the two opinions. 
Stromberg was a nineteen-year-old woman who worked as a super-
visor at a children's summer camp near San Bernardino. Then as 
now, California was at the quirky vanguard of social change, for at 
this summer camp the children were taught 'class consciousness, 
the solidarity of the workers, and the theory that the workers of the 
world are of one blood and brothers all. '26 Every day the kids 
hoisted a Soviet flag over the camp, and for this their supervisor was 
prosecuted under a California penal statute which made it a felony 
to 'display[ ] a red flag ... in any public place ... [1] as a sign, 
symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government[,] or [2] 
as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action[,] or [3] as an aid 
to propaganda that is of a seditious character ... ,'27 
Hughes's opinion begins with six pages that review the statute 
and the trial below and conclude that the trial judge instructed the 
jury to convict if the flag had been displayed for any of the three 
purposes listed in the statute. The remaining two pages find the 
statute's first purpose unconstitutional and overturn the conviction 
because the jury could have reached its verdict on the first clause 
alone. At first glance, this short, technical opinion is no ringing 
victory for free speech; certainly, the statute's second and third 
clauses are patent First Amendment violations by modern stan-
dards. Attention to Stromberg's logic, however, reveals that its ap-
parent technicality is something of a subterfuge, more crafty and 
subversive than it appears, and supportive of free speech in future 
cases. Read carefully, Hughes's opinion breaks with recent prece-
dent, adopts a strict standard for reviewing state restrictions on 
speech, and justifies all this with a powerful constitutional theory. 
23. Paul Freund, Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 43 (1967). 
24. 283 u.s. 359 (1931). 
25. 283 u.s. 697 (1931) 
26. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 362. 
27. Id. at 361. I have added the bracketed numbers to show the three bases for convic-
tion offered by Hughes's interpretation of the California statute. 
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Hughes's first tactic is a smokescreen: he acknowledges that 
free speech is not an absolute right. "There is no question but that 
the State may thus provide for the punishment of those who indulge 
in utterances which incite to violence and crime and threaten the 
overthrow of organized government by unlawful means . . . . We 
have no reason to doubt the validity of the second and third clauses 
of the statute as construed by the state court to relate to such incite-
ments to violence."2s To appreciate the significance of this formula-
tion, one needs to look back for a moment to earlier majority 
opinions upholding the conviction of speakers in the 1920s. As 
Harry Kalven correctly points out, the 1920s majority never applied 
a protective standard of the "clear and present danger" test in sub-
versive advocacy cases.29 Holmes and Brandeis usually dissented 
on the grounds that there was little chance that the speakers actu-
ally intended or were likely to incite acts aimed at the violent over-
throw of the government. For the majority, this did not matter; it 
was enough that the legislature had identified speech with a danger-
ous tendency to provoke illegal acts at some time in the future.Jo 
Although Hughes cites the majority opinion in Gitlow,JI 
Stromberg appears to favor the minority test offered by Brandeis in 
Whitney.J2 Hughes's sentence structure and analysis do not support 
Gitlow 's dangerous tendency analysis. One must listen to how 
Hughes's use of active verbs demands a tight causal link between 
speech and violence: "utterances which incite to violence and 
crime"JJ can be read to require subsequent violence before speech is 
punished; "threaten the overthrow of organized government by un-
lawful means"J4 can be read to protect any speech which does not 
really threaten to topple the government by violence. There is no 
dangerous tendency language here, no "may incite," only tight, ac-
tive language that tracks the intent of Brandeis's formulations. To 
reinforce this subtle shift towards a more protective "clear and pres-
ent danger" test, the concluding remark "as construed by the state 
court to relate to such incitements to violence"Js cabins the permis-
sible meanings of the statute's second and third clauses. 
28. ld. at 368-69. 
29. Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition at 150-66 (cited in note 20). 
30. See, e.g., Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 668-69. 
31. ld. Hughes's other toehold in the precedents was Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 
(1927), the only recent extant Supreme Court case to support a speaker. Fiske overturned a 
subversive advocacy conviction on the grounds that the utter lack of evidence violated the 
due process clause, but it did not update or question Gitlow's dangerous tendency analysis. 
32. 274 U.S. at 376-77. 
33. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369. 
34. ld. 
35. ld. 
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If this were all Hughes offered, his opinion would be an incre-
mental but significant shift toward support for free speech, a hope-
ful turn away from the restrictive, almost paranoid decisions of the 
1920s. But there is more: after sparing the second and third ele-
ments of California's statute, Hughes pounces on the first. He 
quotes at length from the cautionary language of the opinion below, 
which warned that "opposition" could be read to include legal 
political activity. Then his rhetoric, punching tight and hard at the 
end of the opinion: "The maintenance of the opportunity for free 
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive 
to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful 
means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a 
fundamental principle of our constitutional system."36 Here, in the 
majority opinion of the Supreme Court's very first pro-free speech 
case, we see rich public debate theory, brief but unmistakable. 
Hughes recognizes the popular sovereignty that underlies American 
constitutional government, and he echoes the spirit of Brandeis's 
magisterial passage in Whitney.37 There is biting satire here, too, in 
the use of the word "security" -the logical inference is that political 
discussion, not California's statute, serves the security of America. 
In sum, Hughes's restrained majority opinion in Stromberg is 
best read as subversive of the earlier anti-free speech tradition, an 
about-face rather than a cautious swing to the left. Its about-face 
quality is more apparent if one considers that Stromberg raised is-
sues identical to the dozen or so subversive advocacy decisions from 
the 1920s. With one narrow exception,Js these recent cases sup-
ported repressive, hostile treatment of radical speakers by both state 
and federal statutes. None of these cases showed the careful atten-
tion to statutory construction offered by Hughes-indeed the opin-
ion's very technicality is part of its strength as a departure from the 
earlier cases. Sensitivity to the 1920s cases shows that Stromberg 
was as dramatic a shift in First Amendment jurisprudence as Jones 
& Laughlin was in commerce clause jurisprudence-perhaps more 
so, since the latter could draw support from a parallel tradition of 
36. ld. 
37. [The Founders) believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you 
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that 
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discus-
sion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious 
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discus-
sion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of American 
government. 
274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
38. Fiske, 274 U.S. at 380. 
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cases upholding certain types of national economic regulation,39 
and from early Marshall Court pronouncements such as Gibbons v. 
Ogden.40 
Near v. Minnesota•I offers an equally forceful repudiation of 
earlier First Amendment cases. Near was argued four months 
before Stromberg, and the two should be read as a pair. Unlike 
Stromberg, which mirrored the facts of earlier subversive advocacy 
cases, the facts of Near were unlike any recently before the Court. 
Hughes seized this opportunity to write a manifesto on the merits of 
a vigorous and critical press that severely curtailed local power to 
regulate speech for the general welfare. His opinion generated a 
heated and elaborate dissent by all four Horsemen, unlike the two 
narrow dissents in Stromberg. 
As before, Hughes begins by reviewing the state statute and the 
facts below. Minnesota law provided that any 'obscene, lewd and 
lascivious' or 'malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, 
magazine or other periodical' could be enjoined as a public nui-
sance.•2 Truth alone was no defense to the statute-the offending 
material had to published with good motives as well. A Minneapo-
lis paper called the Saturday Press was indicted under the statute 
for publishing "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" articles 
about the local government. Hughes relates only that "the articles 
charged in substance that a Jewish gangster was in control of gam-
bling, bootlegging and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law 
enforcing officers and agencies were not energetically performing 
their duties. "43 The bigoted, scurrilous quality of the articles is bet-
ter conveyed by Butler's dissent, which quotes some representative 
passages44-but Hughes's summary is accurate, if understated. 
Near lost at trial and in the state supreme court, and was enjoined 
from further publication of scandalous newspapers under any 
name.•s 
Hughes begins his analysis with a critical sentence: "This stat-
ute, for the suppression as a public nuisance of a newspaper or peri-
odical, is unusual, if not unique, and raises questions of grave 
importance transcending the local interests involved in the particu-
39. See, e.g., Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding regulation of lottery tickets 
sold across state lines); Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding 
regulation of interstate railroads); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (upholding regula-
tion of stockyards as a conduit of interstate commerce). 
40. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824). 
41. 283 u.s. 697 (1931). 
42. ld. at 702. 
43. ld. at 704. 
44. ld. at 724-27, n.l. 
45. Id. at 706. 
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lar action."46 It is easy to forget that the statute was not in fact 
unusual, because it patently conflicts with modem free speech val-
ues. Recall, however, that numerous cases between 1870 and 1910 
had allowed states to regulate speech for the public welfare, which 
was all Minnesota's nuisance law purported to accomplish. For 
Hughes's purposes, however, the law could be labeled unique be-
cause the first Supreme Court cases to discuss the First Amendment 
were only a decade old, and all involved criminal punishment, not 
civil injunctions. Earlier prior restraint cases like Davis,47 which 
allowed a local mayor to censor his critics by denying them a per-
mit, easily disposed of Near's due process argument-yet Hughes 
could ignore these cases because they were much older and outside 
the well-established boundaries of the recent subversive advocacy 
cases. Furthermore, the facts of Near were closer to the 1920s cases 
than they first appear. Although the statute allowed the state to 
enjoin a newspaper from publication, the injunction was nothing 
more than an ex-post remedy for nuisance, and the nuisance had to 
be proved as a factual matter before the remedy could issue. In 
short, enjoining a paper that has proved to be a public nuisance is 
little different from imprisoning a speaker who has made a seditious 
speech-both sanctions tum on the content and effect of the speech. 
Hughes's opening line, then, is important because it portrays 
an ordinary restriction of speech as an unusual one, one that raises 
"grave" concerns which may outweigh "local interests." He an-
nounces that because "constitutional questions" are involved, the 
Court will review the statute as to "operation and effect," not 
merely search for errors by the trial court in applying the statute. 48 
As in Stromberg, however, this heightened standard of review is en-
tirely new. Precedents only four years old gave local statutes re-
stricting speech only minimal scrutiny. Read alongside Stromberg's 
treatment of the California statute, Hughes here establishes de novo 
review of First Amendment claims by the Supreme Court. 
Hughes proceeds to analyze the "operation and effect" of Min-
nesota's statute. To paraphrase his lengthy analysis, Hughes inter-
prets the statute to allow public officials to haul a publisher into 
court for criticizing the authorities and enjoin him from future criti-
cal publication. "This is of the essence of censorship,"49 he con-
cludes-and indeed it is, as he has described the statute, but his 
description is highly deceptive. Here, a brief return to Stromberg 
46. I d. at 707. 
47. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
48. Near, 283 U.S. at 708-09. 
49. Id. at 713. 
1993] FREE SPEECH 145 
helps to decipher what Hughes is doing. Near, like Stromberg, pur-
ports to examine a statute very closely to determine its practical 
effect on speech-but neither case leaves any room for official dis-
cretion to interpret the statute in a permissible way. Stromberg re-
jected the lower court's decision to assume the local jury would read 
the California statute's overly general first prong in light of the per-
missible purposes of the second and third parts. But in fact, the 
entire California statute easily could have been read to prohibit only 
speech with a dangerous tendency to provoke lawless action-a nat-
ural reading that would have rendered the statute acceptable under 
recent Supreme Court opinions. In Stromberg, Hughes insisted on 
pessimism, on refusing to give local officials the benefit of the doubt, 
and he conjured up an image of the statute being used to repress a 
mainstream political opposition party carrying flags. In so doing, 
he wrote an opinion that purported to be technical, but in fact un-
dermined the entire California statute by supporting political oppo-
sition and reading the constitutional portions to ban only direct 
incitements to violence. 
In his description of the Minnesota statute's "operation and 
effect," Hughes has pulled off the same slight of hand-he charac-
terizes the statute in the most extreme way possible, and describes 
its potential operation in a way that suggests it will be used to re-
press mainstream critics of the government. Here, instead of a 
marching mainstream opposition party, there is the image of a pub-
lisher writing about corruption in the government and being drag-
ged into court for criticizing the authorities. Hughes's portrait of 
the statute is laden with the words "public," "officials" and "au-
thorities." This repeated language emphasizes that officials might 
immunize themselves from popular criticism, forcing the reader to 
worry about the democratic implications of the law. 
This refocusing of concern distracts the reader from recogniz-
ing that Near was an easy case that should have gone the other way 
under contemporary doctrine. As of 1930 virtually no judge had 
ever acknowledged a First Amendment issue when public officials 
shut down some crackpot like the antisemitic publisher of the Sat-
urday Review. The statute before Hughes had not been used to cen-
sor a mainstream newspaper editorial, and there was no reason on 
its face to fear that it would, for the terms "malicious," "scandal-
ous" and "defamatory" did not demand a reading directed at re-
sponsible criticism of public officials. Even before its legal analysis 
begins, then, Hughes's Near opinion shows a both a deep mistrust 
for any law that could allow government officials to entrench them-
selves against the democratic political process, and a willingness to 
protect even fringe critics of the government from punishment. 
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Hughes's extreme description of the statute determines the out-
come of his analysis, for it enables him to analyze the statute as a 
prior restraint law. Even English common law before the American 
revolution forbid prior restraints on publication, so Hughes could 
strike down Minnesota's statute on the conservative authority of 
Blackstone. Hughes cites critics of Blackstone who charged that 
the freedom of speech must apply to ex post punishments as well as 
prior restraints or mean nothing, but notes that "[i]n the present 
case, we have no occasion to inquire as to the permissible scope of 
subsequent punishment."so Hughes describes the statute so as to 
camouflage the real issue presented by Near: the permissible scope 
of the state's power to punish harmful speech. 
The remainder of the opinion celebrates the immunity of the 
press from prior restraint, and it is punctuated with ringing quota-
tions that emphasize the centrality of a free press to democratic 
government. From the Continental Congress: 
The importance of [freedom of the press] consists ... in its diffu-
sion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, 
its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its 
consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppres-
sive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable 
and just modes of conducting affairs.st 
From Madison: 
In every State, probably, in the Union, the press has exerted a 
freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of public men of 
every description which has not been confined to the strict limits 
of the common law .... [T]o the press alone, chequered as it is 
with abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs which 
have been gained by reason and humanity over error and 
oppression. s2 
Hughes concludes in his own words, "Public officers, whose charac-
ter and conduct remain open to debate and free discussion in the 
press, find their remedies for false accusations in actions under the 
libel laws providing for redress and punishment, and not in pro-
ceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and 
periodicals."s3 
Near is a case that hammers the importance of the First 
Amendment as a mechanism for the public to monitor its agents in 
50. ld. at 715. 
51. ld. at 717. 
52. ld. at 718. 
53. ld. at 718-19. 
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the government. The description of the statute, the legal analysis, 
the supporting authority-all emphasize again and again that in a 
democracy the people retain a central freedom to criticize their gov-
ernment. Hughes may pretend the statute is only about "prior re-
straints," but this is of no moment, for the logic of the rich public 
debate theory that rolls off page after page is much more powerful, 
and Hughes reserves the question of subsequent punishment, saying 
it must be "consistent with constitutional privilege."s4 As in 
Stromberg, the opinion's logic and unforgiving construction of the 
state statute serve as signposts-billboards, really-that send the 
reader a strong message about what subsequent punishments might 
be upheld by future opinions. The clear losers are state and local 
governments, and Hughes's talk of Blackstone and Madison cannot 
obscure the fact that in Near the states lose a long-held power to 
regulate speech by moderate restraints in support of the general 
welfare. 
Hughes may fool a modem reader, but he does not fool the 
Horsemen. Butler and his posse thunder out of the gates with a 
passage that illuminates Near as an utter repudiation of earlier as-
sumptions about the relation between state and federal authority: 
The decision of the Court in this case declares Minnesota and 
every other State powerless to restrain by injunction the business 
of publishing and circulating among the people malicious, scan-
dalous and defamatory periodicals that in due course of judicial 
procedure has been adjudged to be a public nuisance. It gives to 
freedom of the press a meaning and a scope not heretofore recog-
nized and construes "liberty" in the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to put upon the States a federal restric-
tion that is without precedent.ss 
Citing Barron v. Baltimore,s6 Butler acknowledges that prior to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution "did not protect the right 
of free speech or press against state action," but he cannot resist 
adding that "the constitutions and laws of the States ... operated 
adequately to protect it."s7 Butler exposes a number of deceptions 
in the majority opinion. First, he draws a concrete picture of the 
facts of the case at hand, offering details that Hughes omitted. Em-
phasizing the antisemitic nature of the Saturday Review's articles, 
he reads "malicious" and "scandalous" only as broadly as their or-
dinary meaning would allow, and finds (accurately) that the words 
54. ld. at 720. 
55. ld. at 723 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
56. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
57. Near, 283 U.S. at 723. 
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describe the publication before the Court. The footnoted text of the 
articles supports Butler's position, for they were highly offensive.ss 
Butler also challenges Hughes's exaggerated interpretation of 
the statute. He writes, "The defendant here has no standing to as-
sert that the statute is invalid because it might be construed so as to 
violate the Constitution. His right is limited solely to the inquiry 
whether ... the effect of applying the statute is to deprive him of his 
liberty without due process of law."s9 For Butler, the law does not 
deprive Near of liberty without due process: the motives ofthe stat-
ute aim at protecting the public's interest in repressing scandalous 
and malicious stories; the defendant is not suppressed without a 
hearing; and the statute provides adequate defenses to protect so-
cially useful publications that print truthful accusations for public-
spirited reasons. Butler reminds us that "this court is by well estab-
lished rule required to assume, until the contrary is made to appear, 
that there exists in Minnesota a state of affairs that justifies [the 
statute]."60 
This last point is more than a bland repetition of a rule of stat-
utory construction-for with his sensitive interest in the facts, But-
ler finds evidence that Near's various business activities (including 
publishing) are properly a serious concern of the local authorities. 
He cites evidence that Near's paper had been used to blackmail for-
mer business associates, and that Near was linked to gambling and 
organized crime. In other words, Butler sees the good guys and bad 
guys rather differently from Hughes. To read Hughes's opinion, 
one would think that the government of "urban" Minneapolis was 
riddled with potential for crime and corruption, checked only by 
"courageous" publishers like Near. The reader has no reason to 
prefer one factual picture to the other, of course, but the discrep-
ancy supports the theory that Hughes has a broader agenda, an 
agenda which champions the First Amendment as a safeguard of 
the people's right to monitor, instruct or recall their agents in the 
government. 
Butler closes by attacking Hughes's effort to paint the dispute 
as a prior restraint case. Butler points out that Blackstone under-
stood prior restraints as unbridled discretion in the hands of admin-
istrative officers. This was not how the statute worked, as we have 
seen, and Butler stresses the point: 
It is fanciful to suggest similarity between the granting or en-
58. In modern jurisdictions such as Canada that control hate speech, Near's articles 
might be grounds for criminal prosecution. 
59. Near, 283 U.S. at 725-26. 
60. ld. at 731. 
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forcement of the decree authorized by this statute to prevent fur-
ther publication of malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles 
and the previous restraint upon the press by licensers as referred 
to by Blackstone and described in the history of the times to 
which he alludes.61 
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Butler thus reads the statute to impose subsequent punishment, not 
prior restraint. 
Attention to Butler's dissent, then, confirms the view of Near 
offered above: the opinion was crafted to chart a new direction in 
First Amendment jurisprudence. In Near and its companion 
Stromberg, Hughes effected a radical break with the earlier anti-free 
speech tradition of the 1920s, and in so doing he asserted that an 
intrusive federal norm unrecognized by earlier cases would hence-
forth limit local actions. Hughes supported this about-face with re-
peated language which emphasized that the First Amendment 
protects criticism of the government as central to democracy. This 
analysis reveals Near as an early companion to New York Times v. 
Sul/ivan,62 a prototype that shows a similar concern for public de-
bate in the democratic process. The parallel emerges more strongly 
if one considers the factual and institutional issues that underlay the 
two opinions. Both cases reviewed a common-law doctrine used by 
local officials to censure their critics, and both held that federal 
norms restricted the scope of local action. The plaintiffs in New 
York Times were more sympathetic than those in Near, and Bren-
nan could draw on a richer body of free speech writings to develop 
his elegant opinion, but neither of these differences should obscure 
Near's stature as the foundation of a jurisprudence devoted to the 
protection of rich public debate. 
Taken together, the structure and logic of Near and Stromberg 
suggested that in future cases, the Court would closely scrutinize 
local actions that might compromise the integrity of the political 
process by restricting speech. Over the next ten years the Court 
was to fulfill the implicit promises of Near and Stromberg by sup-
porting free speech against a diverse array of local challenges. 
III. THE CONTOURS OF A TRADITION 
Harry Kalven envisioned the Supreme Court's First Amend-
ment cases as an organic tradition that over time perfects the rules 
of democratic debate.63 While Kalven was an astute reader of opin-
ions and a thorough student of the major Hughes Court cases, he 
61. ld. at 736 (emphasis in original). 
62. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
63. Kalven, A Worthy Tradition at 150-166 (cited in note 20). 
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may not have observed that the tradition he saw elaborated over 
decades and culminating in New York Times v. Sullivan was actu-
ally intact in its essential details and insights by 1940. Near and 
Stromberg introduced the foundation of this nascent tradition: the 
theory that free critical debate was essential to the ongoing process 
of democratic government. Subsequent Hughes Court cases built 
over this foundation the essential architecture of modem First 
Amendment analysis: doctrines such as strict scrutiny, void for 
vagueness, chilling and unbridled discretion. The free speech opin-
ions of 1931-1941 thus delineate most of the liberal First Amend-
ment tradition commonly celebrated as a product of the 1960s. 
Before reviewing the cases that built on the achievements of 
Near and Stromberg, it might be helpful to summarize the First 
Amendment doctrines the first two opinions established. By giving 
detailed readings of state laws and declining to presume the laws 
were constitutional, both applied what was later called "strict scru-
tiny" to statutes restricting free speech. Near founded prior re-
straint doctrine, and although it quoted Blackstone and early 
republican sources for a traditional common-law view of the doc-
trine, its strong language could be readily extended to condemn 
other regulatory schemes that restricted the press. 
The Court's next First Amendment opinion broadened Near's 
prior restraint analysis into a doctrine invoked to review govern-
ment actions that burdened the press without raising concerns of 
naked censorship by injunction or administrative order. Citing 
Near, the Court in Grosjean v. American Press Co. 64 held that a two 
percent tax on the gross profits of Louisiana's largest newspapers 
was an unconstitutional prior restraint of free speech. After a thor-
ough summary of Near's reasoning, Grosjean found that Near's test 
applied to "any action of the government by means of which it 
might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as 
seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent 
exercise of their rights as citizens."6s Sutherland concludes "[a] 
free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the govern-
ment and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter our-
selves."66 One is moved to wonder aloud if this can possibly be the 
same judge who joined Butler's angry dissent in Near five years ear-
lier. Evidently the democratic importance of a free press was per-
suasive enough to win over some of its early detractors. Sutherland 
celebrates the same popular right to criticize and monitor the gov-
64. 297 u.s. 233 (1936). 
65. ld. at 249·50 (citation omitted). 
66. ld. at 250. 
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ernment that had been either novel or controversial in recent Bran-
deis and Hughes opinions. Some of his enthusiasm, however, may 
derive from the claimants' status as mainstream, established corpo-
rations who gained the benefit of important new protections under 
the due process clause. 
In early 1937, the Court returned to subversive advocacy issues 
in DeJonge v. Oregon.67 The case arose under Oregon's criminal 
syndicalism act, which outlawed speeches or writings that advo-
cated 'crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful acts or 
methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or 
political change or revolution.'6s De Jonge was a member of the 
Communist Party; he attended and spoke at a public meeting in 
Portland sponsored by the local party chapter. Various people 
spoke about local jail conditions and a local strike, but there was no 
evidence of any advocacy of criminal syndicalism as defined by the 
statute, and only 10-15% of those who attended were party mem-
bers. After reviewing the record below, Hughes found that De 
Jonge was tried, convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison 
solely because "he had assisted in the conduct of a public meeting, 
albeit otherwise lawful, which was held under the auspices of the 
Communist Party."69 
DeJonge was an easy case. Even before Near and Stromberg, 
Fiske v. Kansas1o had overturned a subversive advocacy conviction 
for the absence of any supporting evidence: here also there was no 
evidence of subversive advocacy. Hughes's DeJonge analysis ech-
oes Stromberg. It confirms that only incitements to crime may be 
punished as an abuse of the right of free speech: "[L]egislative in-
tervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing with 
the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed."7I In a 
passage of remarkable clarity, he argues (as he implied in 
Stromberg) that free speech is essential to state security and demo-
cratic government: 
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from 
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and vio-
lence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the 
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly 
in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, 
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the 
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful 
67. 299 u.s. 353 (1937). 
68. ld. at 357. 
69. I d. at 362. 
70. 274 u.s. 380 (1927). 
71. DeJonge, 299 U.S. at 364-65. 
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means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foun-
dation of constitutional government. 72 
Ten years later, Hughes here establishes as law Brandeis's great as-
sertion from Whitney, that repression of speech and democracy are 
incompatible. 73 De Jonge left unresolved the issue of when advo-
cacy against the state would become an unlawful incitement to vio-
lence, and it added no new doctrines to the Court's First 
Amendment analysis. But it settled the essential theory of free 
speech jurisprudence: in a democratic government, the people com-
mand a sovereign power to criticize the government and debate its 
actions. As of early 1937, all four Hughes Court First Amendment 
opinions had extolled this principle. 
In April of 1937, the Court in Herndon v. Lowry74 reviewed 
the eighteen year sentence of a communist convicted for fomenting 
insurrection in Georgia. One searches the opinion in vain for his 
first name, but Herndon must have possessed awe-inspiring cour-
age, for in addition to being a communist he was black, and the 
party sent him to Atlanta to start a local organization and distribute 
literature that advocated, among other things, '[e]qual rights for the 
Negroes and self-determination for the Black Belt.'7s After enlist-
ing several members and conducting three meetings, he was ar-
rested, and if his work had barely begun, in retrospect he may have 
been fortunate-Georgia law punished insurrection with death, mit-
igated to five to twenty years only if the jury recommended mercy. 
In the first of several influential free speech decisions he was to au-
thor, Justice Roberts reviewed at length the statute and the findings 
of the courts below-a structure that mimicked the earlier Hughes 
opinions. He found that Herndon's conviction rested primarily on 
the content of the literature found when Herndon was arrested-the 
literature advocating self-determination for blacks in the South. 
There was no evidence that any literature had been distributed. 
Roberts also found that the state had used a "dangerous tendency" 
standard to determine what acts were insurrection. 
Roberts's treatment of the case vindicates Stromberg as a repu-
diation of earlier 1920s subversive advocacy decisions. First, he ex-
pressly rejects dangerous tendency analysis: "[Gitlow] furnishes no 
warrant for the appellee's contention that ... the standard of guilt 
may be made the 'dangerous tendency' of [ ] words. "76 As we saw 
72. ld. at 365. 
73. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76. 
74. 301 u.s. 242 (1937). 
75. ld. at 250. 
76. Id. at 258. 
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above, however, Gitlow stood for just this standard. Roberts follows 
Stromberg by adopting the incitement standard to review subversive 
advocacy cases, and here he quotes the "clear and present danger" 
language (its first appearance in a decade) from the 1920s dissents 
of Holmes and Brandeis. Roberts states that the government may 
punish speakers only when "wilful and intentional interference with 
the described operations of the government might be inferred from 
the time, place, and circumstances of [their] act[s]."77 For Roberts, 
the "clear and present danger" image expresses a requirement that 
some immediate threat to the operation of government must be 
present before officials may punish a speaker. 
Roberts also establishes the important First Amendment doc-
trine of "void for vagueness." He writes, "[W]here a statute is so 
vague and uncertain as to make criminal an utterance or an act 
which may be innocently said or done with no intent to resort to 
violence ... a conviction under such a law cannot be sustained."78 
Roberts shows that "void for vagueness" is the critical flaw of dan-
gerous tendency analysis-statutes that punish words for their dan-
gerous tendency hold speakers responsible for remote and unlikely 
events that the speaker may neither wish for nor intend. Such un-
certain penalties unconstitutionally burden a speaker's power of free 
speech. He links this insight to the essential free speech theory of 
the Hughes decisions: "peaceful agitation for a change of our form 
of government is within the guaranteed liberty of speech .... "79 
Roberts explains the application of these principles to 
Herndon's case in the remainder of the opinion. He writes first that 
the statute as applied punished Herndon for enlisting members into 
a political party. Herndon was not punished because he himself ad-
vocated violence against the government, but because his political 
party printed materials that advocated possible resort to violence 
against the government at some indefinite time in the future. The 
state made no showing that any literature threatening its security 
was distributed, or that insurrection was even remotely likely. Rob-
erts therefore concludes that the statute involves a jury in "pure 
speculation as to future trends of thought and action." He points 
out that "[t]he Act does not prohibit incitement to violent interfer-
ence with any given activity or operation of the state .... Nor is 
any specified conduct or utterance of the accused made an of-
fense."so He closes by again stressing the burden such a law places 
77. ld. at 256. 
78. Id. at 259. 
79. ld. 
80. ld. at 261. 
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on the popular right to press for changes in the government: 
The statute, as construed and applied, amounts merely to a 
dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a change of 
government if a jury can be persuaded that he ought to have fore-
seen his words would have some effect in the future conduct of 
others. No reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt is pre-
scribed. So vague and indeterminate are the boundaries thus set 
to the freedom of speech and assembly that the law necessarily 
violates the guarantees of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.s1 
One sees in Herndon isolated cases beginning to cohere as a tradi-
tion around the organizing principle of freedom to criticize the gov-
ernment. Upon the bare bones of this theory, first offered by 
Stromberg, Herndon looks to DeJonge for support and fleshes out 
some important new doctrines and standards. The cases begin to 
interact with one another, suggesting doctrines not yet present in 
any single case alone. 
Herndon shows by implication that statutes held "void for 
vagueness" raise two independent concerns. The first is notice--
under a dangerous tendency regime, speakers will not be sure when 
they will be liable for arguing for changes in the government. This 
concept finds expression in later cases as a concern for laws that 
"chill" the exercise of free speech rights. The second issue alluded 
to by these cases is the problem of "unbridled discretion" of local 
officials to interpret a vague law. One sees Hughes in Stromberg 
worried about the possibility that public officials can apply speech-
restricting laws to silence their opponents. By the time Roberts ar-
ticulates the "void for vagueness" doctrine in Herndon, the concern 
for abuse of official discretion lies just beneath the surface of his 
statements about the jury's freedom to speculate about the future 
consequences of a speech. 
It is no surprise, then, that the next Supreme Court First 
Amendment case formally establishes that laws which vest public 
officials with unbridled discretion over the power of free speech are 
unconstitutional. Lovell v. City of Griffin s2 reviewed a Georgia 
town ordinance that required those who wished to distribute hand-
bills or literature on the city streets to get a permit from the local 
officials. Lovell, a Jehovah's Witness, believed that to seek permis-
sion from the city for her proselytizing would violate her religion's 
commandments. When she did not apply for a permit, she was 
cited for handbilling. Hughes's opinion is brief, clipped and em-
81. ld. at 263-64. 
82. 303 u.s. 444 (1938). 
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phatic. He describes the ordinance as one that "embraces literature 
in the widest sense." After holding the ordinance facially invalid, 
he writes, "Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its 
character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the free-
dom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. "sJ 
Here again, the logical justification for this summary result is 
Hughes's concern for preserving First Amendment freedoms as a 
vehicle to criticize the government. There was no evidence to sug-
gest the ordinance was being applied in a discriminatory way, for 
the Jehovah's Witness had not even applied for a permit. Hughes 
uses the words "license and censorship" to convey his sense that the 
ordinance offers a dangerous potential for official abuse of author-
ity. He concludes, "The press ... comprehends every sort of publi-
cation which affords a vehicle of information and opinion. What we 
have had recent occasion to say with respect to the vital importance 
of protecting this essential liberty from every sort of infringement 
need not be repeated,"s4 and he cites Near, Grosjean and DeJonge. 
The citation refers to both subversive advocacy cases and free press 
cases, and what "need not be repeated" is their shared mantra that 
a democratic people must retain the power of free speech so that 
they may freely and openly criticize their government. 
Lovell offers two important additions to the growing free 
speech tradition of the Hughes Court. First, the record did not sug-
gest that the Jehovah's Witnesses were agitating for a change in the 
government-as observed above, they had not even been denied a 
permit. Hughes was simply concerned with the structure of the or-
dinance and the power it placed in local officials. It mattered not 
that the speakers were now a religious minority with no apparent 
political agenda. This suggests an insight elaborated more fully in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut ss and subsequent religious freedom cases-
namely, that democratic society demands an openness for all types 
of opinion, even those not expressly directed at reforming govern-
ment. Cantwell, discussed below, illuminates this theory more com-
pletely than Hughes's attenuated opinion in Lovell, however, so I 
will set aside this idea for the moment. 
Second, Lovell invents a vital formulation that still has a con-
tested role in First Amendment jurisprudence. While criticizing the 
Griffin ordinance, Hughes writes that it "prohibits the distribution 
of literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any man-
83. ld. at 451. 
84. ld. at 452. 
85. 310 u.s. 296 (1940). 
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ner without a permit from the City Manager."s6 Later opinions 
inverted this statement, finding that more narrow restrictions on the 
time, place or manner of speech were permissible. Hughes elabo-
rated this aspect of Lovell four years later in Cox v. New Hamp-
shire,87 where he upheld a local ordinance requiring that groups 
planning a parade in the city streets first get a permit from the 
mayor. Here again, the plaintiffs were Jehovah's Witnesses who 
claimed that applying for a permit would be against their religious 
beliefs. Hughes passed over the free exercise aspect of their First 
Amendment claims. Distinguishing Lovell, he found that liberty 
depended on a certain degree of organization in society, and that 
the parade permit system was constitutional because it was nar-
rowly directed at 'organized formations of persons using the high-
ways.'ss Since these early, functionalist and innocuous beginnings, 
however, "time, place, manner" analysis has grown into a vast cate-
gory of exceptions to the First Amendment, allowing governments 
to restrict speaking opportunities in a broad variety of ways.s9 
Perhaps the most interesting and difficult First Amendment 
opinion from the Hughes Court era was Hague v. C.10.,90 decided 
a year after Lovell in 1939. The case arose from the enforcement of 
Jersey City ordinances against the C.I.O. Under color of the ordi-
nances, labor organizers were repeatedly denied permits to speak in 
the town halls, searched upon entry into the city, barred from pam-
phleting on the city streets, and even forcibly ejected from the city 
limits. Even in the matter-of-fact language of Roberts's opinion, the 
whole scene appears as a Hughesian nightmare, confirming the 
worst fears of opinions like Stromberg and Lovell-for in Jersey 
City, local officials showed themselves eager to use power over 
speech to entrench themselves against opposing views. Hague 
found in favor of the union 5-2 (two justices did not participate). 
The majority agreed that the Jersey City ordinances were an uncon-
stitutional restriction of free speech. In a remarkable debate, how-
ever, they split over the question of whether the privileges and 
immunities clause or the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment compelled this result. Roberts, joined by Black and 
Hughes, favored the former result, Stone and Reed the later. Since 
both sides agreed on the importance of free debate, however, further 
discussion of Hague is unnecessary. Apart from its conflicting 
views of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hague fits squarely within the 
86. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451. 
87. 312 u.s. 569 (1941). 
88. ld. at 575. 
89. See Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, 26 Suffolk U.L. Rev. I (1992). 
90. 307 u.s. 496 (1939). 
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evolving tradition of cases concerned with protecting democracy by 
restricting the power of local majorities to curtail opposition speech. 
Following his opinion in Hague, Roberts in the fall of 1939 
delivered Schneider v. State,9I another important free speech deci-
sion that added a working methodology to the perhaps doctrinaire 
results of earlier Hughes Court cases. Schneider addressed a ques-
tion suggested by the facts of Lovell. While faced with an inability 
to control speech through permits, municipalities could still regu-
late speech with a technique known today as a "flat ban." Three of 
the four cases consolidated before the Court as Schneider involved 
ordinances that banned all handbilling from a city's streets because 
handbilling tended to cause litter. Roberts held them an invalid re-
straint of free speech, and his analysis offered a way to accommo-
date the city's interest in clean streets with the speaker's desire to 
communicate with passers-by. As discussed by Owen Piss in a re-
cent article,92 in Schneider Roberts first applied the familiar 
"weighted balancing test" to First Amendment claims. He ex-
plained, "Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters 
of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other 
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes 
the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic insti-
tutions. "93 Roberts asked that the regulatory aims of local statutes 
be weighed against the heavy importance of free speech in a demo-
cratic society. Here, since the municipality could easily control lit-
ter by punishing those who threw handbills to the ground, its 
interest did not outweigh the burden placed on speech by a flat ban 
against handbilling. In Schneider, then, Roberts pioneered an im-
portant new method of analysis while adhering to the central free 
speech theory he and Hughes had developed in previous opinions: 
free speech weighs heavily against other government aims because it 
is "vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. "94 
In the spring of 1940, the Court decided a pair of labor picket-
ing cases, Car/eson v. California9s and Thornhill v. Alabama,96 
where anti-loitering laws had been used to arrest union demonstra-
tors. Justice Murphy overturned the convictions in succinct and 
authoritative opinions. He wrote: "[T]he group in power at any 
moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful 
discussion of matters of public interest merely on a showing that 
91. 308 u.s. 147 (1939). 
92. Fiss, 26 Suffolk U. L. Rev. at I (cited in note 89). 
93. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161. 
94. ld. 
95. 310 u.s. 106 (1940). 
96. 310 u.s. 88 (1940). 
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others may thereby be persuaded to action inconsistent with its in-
terests."97 Murphy reaffirmed the Court's willingness to hold laws 
restricting free speech facially invalid. The language quoted above 
reduces the essential Hughes Court free speech theory to a single 
sentence. Free speech is not merely a right, it is a power, and the 
First Amendment protects the people from their agents in the gov-
ernment who would usurp that power. 
Taken as a group, then, the Hughes Court free speech cases 
established doctrines of strict scrutiny, prior restraint, void for 
vagueness, unbridled discretion, chilling and time, place, manner 
exceptions. All of these were supplemented with Roberts's 
weighted balancing analysis, which judged First Amendment claims 
against the importance of countervailing state interests while recog-
nizing that the public had a serious, continuous interest in open de-
bate. By 1941, a tradition extolling the principle of free public 
debate and its supporting doctrines had developed around ten elo-
quent cases, and this core tradition promised support for a compre-
hensive and sophisticated free speech jurisprudence in the future. 
Before leaving this argument, an eleventh and final Roberts 
case offers a beautiful summary of the free speech theory articulated 
over the preceding ten years. Cantwell v. Connecticut reviewed a 
local law that barred religious groups from soliciting members of 
other religions.9s A Jehovah's Witness had approached two 
Catholics with a portable phonograph and played a recording that 
attacked Catholicism. The opinion held for the first time that free-
dom of religion was a fundamental liberty protected from state 
abridgement by the Fourteenth Amendment. In an analysis that 
mirrors the approach in Schneider, Roberts balanced the state inter-
est in regulating solicitation against the freedom of religious con-
science. He found that the Jehovah's Witness presented no threat 
of disorder, and that the state law was needlessly broad if it could be 
applied to arrest a peaceful solicitor. Roberts's concluding state-
ment conjoins freedom of religion and freedom of speech as part of 
a common First Amendment tradition: 
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, 
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may 
seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his 
own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times resorts to 
exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, promi-
nent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the peo-
ple of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in 
97. ld. at 104. 
98. 310 u.s. 296 (1940). 
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spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, 
in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right con-
duct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.99 
159 
Perhaps better than any other short quotation, this passage summa-
rizes the ideal of democratic pluralism that underlies the First 
Amendment. More than twenty years before Brennan's New York 
Times opinion, it thoroughly foreshadows the reasoning and result 
of that great case, even down to its observation that as citizens ex-
change heated views, they may resort to falsehoods-and that if we 
have confidence in openness and respect for one another, we need 
not fear such abuse in the long run. 
Cantwell provides an apt conclusion to my review of the 
Hughes Court's free speech tradition, for it both embraces and 
looks beyond the importance of a free exchange of ideas among citi-
zens of a democracy. Cantwell offers a higher vision of the First 
Amendment, one that to this day remains unaddressed by the 
Supreme Court's free speech tradition. For Roberts, the core tradi-
tion protects more than democratic process; it celebrates pluralism, 
tolerance, and a respect for the differing views of one's fellow citi-
zens. The opinion presents a surprisingly contemporary distillation 
of values and challenges that could unify American citizens in all 
our colorful diversity as we struggle to realize the many unfulfilled 
promises of our Constitution in a new century. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION 
Near and Stromberg introduced two lessons the Hughes Court 
First Amendment cases could teach the modern student of constitu-
tional law. As to the first lesson, the subsequent 1930s cases should 
speak for themselves. Hopefully, they have persuaded readers that 
the Hughes Court set forth a sophisticated First Amendment juris-
prudence based on the central importance of rich public debate to 
democracy, and that the liberal free speech tradition located by the 
popular mind as arising out of the 1960s is in fact 30 years older. 
Were this all the cases established, they would rank among the most 
important contributions to constitutional doctrine in this century. 
As I suggested in Part II, however, Near and Stromberg teach a 
second lesson. They inaugurate the complex changes in our consti-
tutional jurisprudence that occurred in the 1930s. 
Scholars commonly identify two major changes in constitu-
tional law in this century: national economic regulation by the 
modern administrative state, and incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
99. Id. at 310. 
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against the states. Both these changes were born in the 1930s. 
Broad federal regulation of the national economy was first legiti-
mated by the commerce clause cases following NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp. 100 and buttressed by separation-of-powers de-
cisions that ratified the new delegation of power to administrative 
agencies. Incorporation of fundamental provisions of the Bill of 
Rights against the states occurred gradually over a series of cases 
holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
bound the states to respect limited rights offree speech101 and mini-
mum standards of criminal due process.1o2 
A vast literature surrounds the relationship between these two 
changes in constitutional law. Much of it focuses on the problem of 
judicial review and the famous footnote four of United States v. 
Carolene Products. 1o3 My purpose here is neither to challenge this 
literature nor engage it on any serious level. Rather, I want to 
refocus scholarly attention on the First Amendment's prominent 
role as a catalyst of constitutional transformation in the early 1930s. 
In my view, scholarly interest in judicial review and substantive due 
process should not obscure the pivotal importance of Near's free 
speech theory as the herald of a new constitutional regime. 
I begin with the strong but overlooked parallel between the 
Court's behavior in the first pro-free speech cases and its behavior 
in the first pro-national regulation cases. In both instances, the 
Court turned its back on a recent, firmly established tradition in 
prior cases to endorse a new nationalist agenda. By exploring this 
similarity, I stress that the Hughes Court First Amendment cases 
came first ; they predated the famous commerce clause shift by five 
years. This matters, as it turns out, to certain established schools of 
constitutional interpretation, and explodes some of the mythology 
surrounding the famous switch in time of 1937. 
The first free speech cases cleverly jumped through hoops to 
distinguish prior cases that demanded opposite results. Stromberg's 
facts were nearly identical to the federal or state subversive advo-
cacy cases of the previous decade that supported restrictions on 
speech. In Near, earlier precedents from the tum of the century 
provided ample support for the proposition that states or munici-
palities could regulate the press by prior restraints or ex post pun-
ishments in service of the general welfare. Both cases set forth a 
radical new program, a commitment to the ideal that local prefer-
ences could not be allowed to impede democratic decision-making 
100. 301 u.s. 1 (1937). 
101. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
102. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
103. 304 U.S. at 152. 
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at the national level-a commitment that had never enjoyed but one 
or two votes on the Court. 
What does it mean to assert that the Court's new protection of 
democratic process was "nationalist"? First, under the logic of 
Hughes's opinion, California's suppression of flags flown in opposi-
tion to the government was an assault on the integrity of the na-
tional democratic process. States and towns had an interest in laws 
regulating advocacy against the government-a desire to keep the 
peace or to preserve local institutions, for example. For Hughes, 
however, in the very first two cases these local interests are openly 
trumped by the need for free public debate, "[so] that government 
may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be 
obtained by lawful means .... "104 Why not let local majorities 
determine what restrictions on speech impeded their democratic 
character? The answer compelled by the logic of Near and 
Stromberg is that local governments are prone to capture by self-
interested agents, and the First Amendment protects the people's 
sovereign power to direct, and if necessary, replace their agents in 
all types of government. Since what passed for subversion in Cali-
fornia might be part of a national movement for change, the integ-
rity of national democracy required that the federal government bar 
California from interfering with the entire nation's power to alter 
the course or structures of its government. 
Near, Stromberg and the ensuing free speech tradition are na-
tionalist on a second level, however. For even if governments, both 
federal and local, are vulnerable to capture by self-interested agents, 
there is nothing on the face of the First Amendment to suggest 
which locus of authority-federal or state-should monitor the 
democratic integrity of the entire system. An important strain of 
American constitutional thought prior to 1930 viewed the actions of 
the national government as likely to be undemocratic. National 
government was feared as unrepresentative, and local communities 
were trusted as the foci of a sovereign people. Even after the First 
Amendment bound the states under the Fourteenth, then, it is pos-
sible to imagine a vision of democracy that gave local communities 
authority to regulate the boundaries of free speech, on the theory 
that at a local level, a sovereign people could more easily overturn 
rules that impeded their ability to monitor, direct or recall their 
agents in the government. 
By 1940, however, all eleven free speech cases had restricted 
the power of some state or local polity to restrain free speech ac-
cording to its own best judgments about the general welfare. The 
104. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369. 
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federal government, through the national Supreme Court, became 
the national arbiter of the democratic process. Before 1931, local 
democracies had the power to monitor the representative character 
ofboth local and national government. After 1931, the federal gov-
ernment through the Supreme Court usurped this power. With 
their nationalist effect thus exposed, Near and Stromberg emerge as 
more than exercises in democratic, rich public debate-free speech 
theory. They also effect a naked shift of power, a shift from state 
and local governments to the national government. Hughes's dem-
ocratic free speech theory alone cannot justify the shift, for it does 
not explain why the Supreme Court is a better monitor of democ-
racy than local communities. As the dissent in Near recognizes, the 
case is about much more than prior restraints on the press. It is a 
constitutional power shift as novel and shattering as the explosion 
of the commerce power six years later. 
The 1930s commerce clause jurisprudence follows the same 
pattern as the Hughes Court First Amendment cases, but since the 
commerce clause story is familiar I will not rehash it with extended 
arguments from particular cases. In early 1930s commerce clause 
cases, the Court blocked New Deal legislation under a well-estab-
lished line of cases that had denied the federal government author-
ity to regulate major aspects of the national economy. As Bruce 
Ackerman's work forcefully reminds us, FOR's economic program 
was endorsed by overwhelming popular and congressional support 
for national regulation as a means of lifting the country out of the 
depression.ws In 1937, after FDR threatened to pack the Court, 
the Supreme Court reversed its earlier position and began to uphold 
FOR's programs. One need not locate a "constitutional moment" 
or an unwritten amendment to the Constitution in these events to 
recognize that they allowed the federal government to assert a new 
level of control over local affairs. In 1934, the federal government 
could not tell Schechter how to run his local poultry business,t06 
but by 1941 it was imposing conditions on the sale of local wheat to 
local customers.101 Both the free speech and the commerce clause 
cases asserted that local actions, economic and political, had 
profound national ramifications that the federal government was 
entitled to supervise or regulate. The free speech cases thus pro-
vided a model of judicial support for nationalism that was paral-
leled six years later in the commerce clause cases. 
Scholars also study the 1930s to explore the roots of incorpora-
105. See Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People 47-50 (Belknap Press, 1991). 
106. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
107. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill (1942). 
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tion, where the Court began to apply the Bill of Rights against the 
states. Again, I do not wish to enter the scholarly debate over the 
origins or theory of incorporation. Near, however, reveals 1931 as a 
critical watershed in the Court's due process jurisprudence. Under 
modern incorporation cases, the due process clause became a con-
stitutional hook for applying the Bill of Rights against the states. 
As most first-year law students learn, these cases have a grim and 
discredited elder cousin-Lochner.ws The Lochner-era Court read 
the due process clause to protect expansive property and contract 
rights from federal and state infringement, usually to the advantage 
of corporations and to the detriment of poor workers. 
Near is the fulcrum of a shift in the Court's due process em-
phasis-from property and contract rights to civil rights. A reader 
can almost see the transition on the face of the opinion; Hughes 
supports his free speech analysis by illustrating the due process 
analysis of earlier contract and property decisions.109 Before Near, 
due process cases mostly protected property and contract rights, 
and ignored other individual liberties. After Near, the Court exer-
cised significant judicial review in both areas for about five years, 
but then retreated from its long-standing supervision of property 
and contracts. A brief canvass of some early, proto-incorporation 
decisions outside the free speech area makes the shift more clear. In 
1932, Nixon v. Condon affirmed blacks' voting rights, overruling a 
Texas effort to exclude blacks from primaries.110 Over the dissent 
of the Four Horsemen, Cardozo dismissed arguments that a private 
political party, and not the state legislature, was the true promulga-
tor of the racial barrier. Cardozo concluded, "The Fourteenth 
Amendment, adopted as it was with special solicitude for the equal 
protection of members of the Negro race, lays a duty upon the court 
to level by its judgment these barriers of color."111 The same year, 
Powell v. Alabama 112 and Sorrel's v. United States 113 articulated 
new national standards of due process for criminal defendants in 
state proceedings. Powell overturned the conviction of a black de-
fendant because the state had denied him counsel at trial. Sorrel's 
overturned a conviction because federal officers had induced the de-
fendant to commit the crime. In 1936, Brown v. Mississippi 114 over-
108. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
109. Near, 283 U.S. at 707. 
I 10. 286 U.S. 73 (1932). This case reaffirmed the terse holding of Nixon v. Herndon, 273 
u.s. 536 (1927). 
Ill. ld. at 89. 
112. 287 u.s. 45 (1932). 
113. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
114. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
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turned the conviction of a black defendant who was brutally beaten 
over a period of several days until he confessed to a crime. All these 
cases held states to new federal standards of fundamental fairness 
before the "switch in time" of 1937. 
There is a second side to the Court's shifting due process re-
view, of course, for as the Court focused on civil and political rights 
it retreated from expansive protection of contract and property 
rights. If the retreat had been more swift, there would have been no 
court-packing crisis, but signs of the Court's retreat appear before 
1937 in the case of Nebbia v. New York,11s where Justice Roberts 
upheld New York's effort to stabilize the milk industry with price 
controls. Justice McReynolds in dissent was joined by the rest of 
the Horsemen, and he accurately pointed out that under the Court's 
precedents, freedom to set prices was a core liberty of contract. 
Near itself had affirmed this principle: 
[W]hile the liberty of contract is not an absolute right . . . the 
power of the State stops short of interference with what are 
deemed to be certain indispensable requirements of the liberty 
assured, notably with respect to the fixing of prices and wages.II6 
Revealingly, McReynolds cited Near in his catalogue of opinions 
establishing the contours of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, supporting my view of Near as a critical transition 
between Lochner and modem due process concerns. 
The due process revolution ultimately styled "incorporation" 
began, in the words of Palko v. Connecticut,ll1 by forcing states to 
respect protections in the Bill of Rights deemed "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty." The word liberty connotes an individ-
ual's freedom from government control, and it is right to insist that 
the incorporation project has focused on the protection of individ-
ual liberties from government restraint. But incorporation is also 
about national standards. In their insistence that open and critical 
debate was essential to democratic government, the free speech 
cases demanded that the states honor national standards of demo-
cratic process. The free speech, due process and commerce clause 
cases all expressed a new confidence in the ability of a national dem-
ocratic community to make collective decisions that bind all its 
constituents. 
My vision of the 1930s free speech cases fragments Bruce Ack-
erman's vision of the New Deal as the prime mover or inaugurator 
115. 291 u.s. 502 (1934). 
116. Near, 283 U.S. 707-08. 
117. 302 U.S. at 325. 
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of his third constitutional regime. I Is He identifies interbranch con-
flict followed by popular ratification as the driving process behind 
fundamental changes in the Constitution. In his view, the Court's 
resistance to Roosevelt's economic plan made the landslide victory 
of 1936 a vindication of that plan, forcing the Court to avoid a con-
stitutional crisis after the popular president proposed the court-
packing plan. If Stromberg and Near are as radical as I argue, if 
they initiate a nationalizing shift in the balance of power between 
federal government and the states, then the court-packing induced 
shift of the commerce clause cases has a precursor in 1931 of equal 
magnitude, and one is forced to conclude that nationalizing forces 
were at work in the judiciary before the crisis of 1936. Near and 
Stromberg argue that interbranch conflict is not the fulcrum of a 
single decisive shift in our constitutional regime. The great changes 
of 1936 began in 1931 and took a decade to flower-not just in com-
merce clause jurisprudence, but in First Amendment and Bill of 
Rights cases as well. 
Ackerman's focus on 1936 also derives support from those who 
locate a decisive constitutional shift in footnote four of Caro/ene 
Products, often read to establish a new theory of judicial review and 
a new balance of power among the branches of the federal govern-
ment.II9 Footnote four, however, cites all six extant Hughes Court 
free speech opinions-Stromberg, Near, Grosjean, De Jonge, 
Herndon and Lovell-and as I argued above, these cases along with 
the criminal process opinions authorized new federal power over 
local affairs long supervised by the states alone. Footnote four is 
best read to ratify the parallel nationalism of the free speech and the 
commerce clause decisions, not to pioneer a new theory of judicial 
review. 
In the area of First Amendment scholarship, Near and 
Stromberg rebuke those who attempt to stretch the 1930s free 
speech canvass around an Ackerman-inspired frame. Discussing 
the Hughes Court free speech cases in the context of Ackerman's 
theories of constitutional change, David Yassky claims that the de-
cisive shift in First Amendment jurisprudence occurred "in the late 
1930s."I2o In my view, this is something like calling Wickard and 
Darby the decisive shift in commerce clause jurisprudence, and the 
conclusion does not stand up to a close reading of the two 1931 
opinions. 
None of this is meant to suggest that the free speech cases ex-
118. Ackerman, We the People at 47-50 (cited in note 105). 
119. Id. at 119-30. 
120. David Yassky, Erasofthe First Amendment, 91 Co1um. L. Rev. 1699, 1730 (1991). 
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actly match the jurisprudential shift of the later commerce clause 
cases. Congress retains power under "dormant commerce clause" 
analysis to intervene when state actions affect the national economy. 
This power implies a correlative freedom to cede power to the 
states. 121 The institutional relationships between state and federal 
power are somewhat different in the free speech and civil rights are-
nas, for Congress cannot defer to state suppression of speech or 
state infringement of the fundamental rights of criminal defendants. 
Such differences aside, however, when the free speech cases are 
compared in method and result to later commerce clause and due 
process cases, they show themselves to be a critical impetus for the 
major constitutional changes of the 1930s. 
CONCLUSION 
It is said that even without a First Amendment, the republican 
structure of the Constitution would demand free speech. The First 
Amendment, then, must be understood to extend beyond the terrain 
of "individual rights." Individual rights are a prominent, even no-
ble aspect of American political theory. But focus on free speech as 
an individual entitlement does not capture the central importance of 
rich public debate in our constitutional regime. I have argued that 
the First Amendment burst into our modem jurisprudence driven 
by the theory that rich public debate was central to democracy, and 
by the belief that democracy at a national level was both possible 
and desirable. The Hughes Court free speech cases inaugurated a 
constitutional shift towards democratic nationalism that blossomed 
as the Court supported an expanded commerce power and incorpo-
ration doctrine. If this perspective on the 1930s can be reduced to a 
single, simple lesson, it is that free speech is best thought of as a 
collective power that binds Americans together as a nation. The 
emergence of this power in the 1930s marks the era of our history 
when we began to envision ourselves as a national community. The 
unfulfilled challenge of this power remains a vision of pluralism and 
tolerance difficult to achieve in a large, heterogeneous nation. But if 
we continue to believe, as did Justice Roberts, that enlightened 
opinion and right conduct are possible in an open society, then 
there is reason to remain optimistic about the power of free speech 
to unite Americans in a more just national community over the 
coming century. 
121. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), a case upholding state 
economic regulations that was decided the same tenn as Jones & Laughlin. 
